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MINES AND MINERALS-Mineral Reservation-Surface
Ownership Includes At Surface Substances and Those Near
Surface Substances Whose Removal Involves Destruction of
Surface By Any Reasonable Method Known at Time
Extraction is Planned.
Reed v. Wylie,
597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
In 1949, the Wylies, owners of the surface estate and three-fourths of
the mineral estate of a tract of land, executed a lease granting the right to
mine coal and lignite by strip mining.' After termination of the lease, the
Wylies conveyed the tract to Reed's predecessors in title, reserving a onefourth undivided interest in and to "all oil, gas and other minerals" on
and under the land.2 Reed sued Wylie seeking title to coal and lignite
capable of being extracted by open pit or strip mining methods and was
awarded summary judgment on the basis of an affidavit stating coal and
lignite could be removed only by surface destructive methods.3 The Waco
Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded, holding the evidence precluded summary judgment because a question of material fact remained
regarding the necessity of surface destructive methods.4 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the judgment of the court of civil appeals' further ruling that a surface owner must prove "as of the date of
1. The tract of land involved is situated in Freestone County, Texas. Reed v. Wylie, 554
S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex. 1977) (Reed I) (rev'd on other grounds, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex.
1980)). In recognition of the damage to the surface inherent in such mining, Wylie was to be
paid $50.00 per acre for the land destroyed or rendered useless. Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d
743, 745 (Tex. 1980) (Reed II).
2. The Wylies considered the lignite would be strip mined at the time of the 1950 deed
since they had previously granted the lignite strip mining lease. See id. at 745.
3. See id. at 746. Reed's summary judgment motion was based on Acker v. Guinn, 464
S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
4. See Wylie v. Reed, 538 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976), aff'd, 554
S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977) (reversed on other grounds, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980)). The court
said Reed had the burden of proving the lignite must be removed by surface destructive
methods. Id. at 189. A concurring opinion stated Reed could not have the lignite "which
may be mined by open pit methods" but only the lignite which must be extracted thereby.
Id. at 189 (Hall, J., concurring). A dissenting opinion urged affirming the trial court, adding
that Reed owned all the lignite that must be mined by surface destructive methods. Id. at
189-90 (James, J., dissenting).
5. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd on other grounds, 597
S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980)). This opinion was substituted for a prior opinion as printed in 20
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 327 (May 25, 1977), withdrawn and superseded, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.
1977). The prior opinion stated the test was whether the surface would be substantially
destroyed in extracting commercially producible quantities of a particular substance. Id. at
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the instrument being construed," extraction of a near surface substance
"would necessarily have depleted" the surface before a mineral reservation would be interpreted to exclude that substance.' The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of the depth of the lignite.7
On remand the trial court held, as a matter of law, that the lignite was at
the surface and, therefore, owned by Reed, as owner of the surface estate.' Subsequently, the Waco Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded, and Reed appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas urging reinstatement of the trial court's judgment.' Held - Judgment affirmed holding and opinion disapproved. Surface ownership includes at surface
substances and those near surface substances whose removal involves destruction of the surface by any reasonable method known at time extraction is planned.1"

329. The subsequent opinion stated the test was whether the surface would be substantially
destroyed in extracting substantialquantities of the substance. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d
169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd on other grounds, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)).
6. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd 597 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex.
1980)). See generally Comment, Lignite: Surface or Mineral - The Surface Destruction
Test and More, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 879, 893 (1977); Note, Beneath the Surface-Destruction
Test: The Dialectic of Intention and Policy, 56 TEXAS L. REV. 99, 103 (1977); 15 Hous. L.
REV. 187, 191 (1977); 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 624, 625 (1978); 31 Sw. L.J. 1163, 1166 (1977).
7. The finding was considered necessary to show whether extraction of the lignite would
necessarily have destroyed the surface. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. 1977)
(rev'd on other grounds 597 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. 1980)). Reed I ruled if lignite existed at
the surface, no further proof would be necessary to grant the surface owner title to the
lignite; if lignite existed near surface, the surface owner would have to show, as of the date
of the instrument being construed, extraction of the substance would necessarily have destroyed the surface. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172-73 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd in part 597
S.W.2d 743, 746-47 (Tex. 1980)). Reed II found the surface owner entitled to the lignite
because it existed at surface as a matter of law; however, if the substance had existed near
surface, the surface owner would need to show removal involved destruction of the surface
by any reasonable method known at the time extraction was contemplated. See Reed v.
Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 746-47 (Tex. 1980).
8. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. 1980) (grantor not entitled to reformation of the deed).
9. Wylie v. Reed, 579 S.W.2d 329, 334-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979), judgment
aff'd-holding and opinion disapproved, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). The court of civil
appeals held summary judgment was precluded in part since "we cannot say as a matter of
law that if the lignite had been mined on the tract . . .in 1950, that such mining would
have consumed or depleted the land surface" since shaft or underground methods were feasible in 1950. Id. at 334-35. The court stated there was conflicting evidence whether the
lignite was at the surface; it implicitly ruled the lignite must outcrop on the particular
tract, not just in the immediate vicinity, before the lignite can be said to be at the surface.
Id. at 334.
10. Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747-48 (Tex. 1980). The Supreme Court of Texas
affirmed the judgment of the court of civil appeals, agreeing summary judgment on the reformation issue was precluded under the evidence presented in support thereof; however, it
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At common law, fee simple ownership extended indefinitely upwards as
well as downwards.' 1 The landowner was the sole person entitled to the
use of anything found on or beneath the surface of his land.' 2 In Texas,
however, mineral rights did not become vested in owners of the land until
the Constitution of 1866 was passed.' 3
All states provide for the separation of the mineral estate from the surface estate;'4 most states provide the mineral estate owner with fee simple
title absent execution of a lease or conveyance of less than a total mineral
interest.' 5 A severance of the two estates may occur by the grantor executing a deed to the surface only, expressly excepting or reserving the

expressly disagreed with the civil appeals court's interpretation of the proof needed to show
minerals exist at the surface. See id. at 747-48. Wylie's reformation plea was based upon
affidavits of the original grantee, Baker, and the attorney who drew up the deed. The affidavits stated the parties intended to reserv6 '/ of the lignite at any depth to the Wylies. The
court held the affidavits would most likely give rise to a reformed deed as between Wylie
and Baker based upon mutual mistake; however, the Wylies had the burden of showing all
subsequent purchasers took with notice of the mutual mistake in the 1959 Wylie/Baker
deed. To offer chance of proof, the case was remanded. Id. at 749.
11. Edwards v. Sims, 24 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Ky. 1929); Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328,
332 (Mont. 1925). "[Clujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMETARIES 18; 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 202, at 20 (1975).
12. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 202, at 20 (1975).
13. Compare 2 H. GAMmEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 177-78 (1840) and Cowan v. Hardeman, 26
Tex. 217, 224-26 (1862) with TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 39 (1866) and 5 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 880 (1866). Mineral ownership was also bestowed upon landowners in the Constitutions of 1869 and 1875. TEX. CONST. art. XIV, § 7 (1875); TEX. CONST. art. X, § 9 (1869); see,
e.g., Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426, 439, 150 S.W. 1149, 1150 (1912); State v. Parker, 61 Tex.
265, 268 (1884); Allen v. Heinatz, 212 S.W.2d 987, 990 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1948), aff'd
on other grounds, 147 Tex. 512, 523, 217 S.W.2d 994, 1000 (1949). But see TEX. NAT. RESOURCES CODE ANN. §§ 52.171-.182 (Vernon 1978). Minerals subject to the Texas Relinquishment Act are owned by the State of Texas. Under the Act the landowner becomes the agent
of the State of Texas. The landowner has no authority to convey minerals; however, after a
lease has been executed, the landowner may convey an interest in the rentals and royalties
reserved in the lease. See id. §§ 52.171-.182. See generally Walker, "The Texas Relinquishment Act", Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION 1ST ANNUAL INST.

ON OIL &

GAS LAW & TAX. 245 (1949).

14. See, e.g., Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 254 S.W. 345, 347 (Ark. 1923); Jilek v.
Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co., 47 N.E.2d 96, 98 (Ill. 1943); Wilson v. Holm, 188
P.2d 899, 904 (Kan. 1948). See generally Masterson, A 1952 Survey of Basic Oil and Gas
Law, 6 Sw. L.J. 1, 15 (1952).
15. Masterson, A 1952 Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Law, 6 Sw. L.J. 1, 15 (1952) (fee
simple title created in the mineral estate regardless of adherence to ownership in place or
nonownership theory); see, e.g., Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (conveyance of minerals by fee owner effects horizontal severance and creation of separate mineral
and surface estates); Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 170, 254
S.W. 290, 293 (1923) (grant of exclusive right to take coal held to be severance of title to
coal from remainder of estate); Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 233-34, 176 S.W. 717,
718-19 (1915) (conveyance of all oil, gas, coal, and other minerals a present grant of title im
fee to oil and gas).
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minerals, executing a deed conveying only a mineral interest, or executing
a mineral lease.16 Once a severance has been effected, the mineral estate7
owner may grant or reserve three basic types of interests: leasehold,'
mineral, or royalty.18 The mineral estate is generally presumed to be the
dominant estate, 9 and its owner is entitled to reasonably use the surface
estate to produce the minerals.2 0 The rationale for dominance is that title
to minerals would be worthless without the rights, express or implied, of
ingress and egress to remove the minerals."
In Texas, the mineral owner may use as much of the surface as is reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose of a mineral conveyance.2 2 In

16. See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 202.2, at 24-25 (1978); Masterson, A 1952 Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Law, 6 Sw L.J. 1, 15 (1952). In a full mineral
conveyance other than in a lease, the grantee acquires the right to develop the minerals, the
power to execute leases, the right to bonuses paid by the oil and gas lessee, the right to
delay rentals payable by the lessee, the right to royalties, and the right "to any other interests reserved to the lessor." Id. at 15.
A reservation creates or reserves something out of the thing granted that was not in
existence before. An exception is something in existence at the time of conveyance as part of
the object granted and is not included in the conveyance. See Donnell v. Otts, 230 S.W. 864,
865 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1921, no writ).
17. A leasehold interest gives the lessee exclusive power to prospect for, sever, and remove the construed minerals from the land. See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
LAW § 202.1, at 21 (1978).
18. Both a mineral and a royalty interest may be created by grant, reservation, or exception. The holder of a royalty interest, distinguished from a mineral interest, is not authorized to go upon the premises to prospect for, sever, or remove minerals, although he
may possess certain rights of ingress and egress to inform himself of exploration operations
on the land. The royalty owner, however, is entitled to share in such minerals as are severed.
See Pich v. Lankford, 157 Tex. 335, 339, 302 S.W.2d 645, 648 (1957) (interest in minerals in
place and interest in royalty separate and distinct estates in land); Sabine Prod. Co. v. Frost
Nat'l Bank, 596 S.W.2d 271, 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (royalty an
interest in land); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (at time minerals severed minerals and royalties become
personalty). See generally 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 202.1, at 21
(1978).
19. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1972); General Crude
Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 106, 344 S.W.2d 668, 669 (1961); Warren Petroleum Corp. v.
Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 469, 271 S.W.2d 410, 413 (1954).
20. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971); see Sun Oil Co. v. Nunnery, 170
So. 2d 24, 29 (Miss. 1964); Pure Oil Co. v. Gear, 83 P.2d 389, 392 (Okla. 1938); General
Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 106, 344 S.W.2d 668, 669 (1961). See generally Comment, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Surface Mining on the Severed Estate - A
Legislative Proposal, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 140, 144 (1975).
21. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. 1967);
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 481, 304 S.W.2d 362, 363 (1957); Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 469, 271 S.W.2d 410, 413 (1954).
22. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. 1967);
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 481, 304 S.W.2d 362, 363 (1957); Harris
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construing what is reasonably necessary, the Supreme Court of Texas has
held the mineral and surface estates must accommodate each other by
conducting their operations with due regard for the rights of the other."'
In Getty Oil Co. v. Jones"' the supreme court held proof of a reasonable
alternative to the challenged surface use requires the mineral owner to
use that alternative technique rather than damaging the surface.2 5 Under
the pronouncement made in Sun Oil v. Whitaker,"s however, the mineral7
2
owner need not consider alternatives unavailable on the particular tract.
Generally, the surface estate includes ownership of the soil and, in
Texas, certain underground water at any depth under the land.2 8 Confu-

v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 99, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (1943). At least one Texas court has held
reasonable use of the surface has nothing to do with the question of ownership of a particular substance. See Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (legal rights accruing to an expressly named substance in
a conveyance not indicative of title to unnamed substance). Absent a showing of negligence
or a contract to pay for damages, the mineral owner is not liable for surface damage occurring from mineral extraction. See McCoy v. Polvado, 583 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ) (when no negligence allegations made, fenced damaged during placement of gas lines as permitted in lease held reasonable use to effectuate lease purposes); Macha v. Crouch, 500 S.W.2d 902, 905-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no
writ) (interference with tract by construction and maintenance in connection with production of oil and gas held not unreasonable when plaintiff failed to prove monetary loss or
negligence).
23. See Ball v. Dillard, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 457, 459 (June 28, 1980) (surface lessee held
to be trespasser when he unreasonably interfered with mineral lessee's right to explore for
and extract minerals in that surface owner locked a gate and furnished mineral estate owner
no key thereto); Ottis v. Haas, 569 S.W.2d 508, 513-14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rule of reasonable accommodation held to involve more than a question of inconvenience to surface owner before it is invoked; enclosed tank batteries operated
by oil and gas lessee and placed on land used only for grazing purposes held not unreasonable when plaintiff failed to show location of tanks would materially interfere with surface
use).
24. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
25. Id. at 622.
26. 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972).
27. Id. at 811-12.
28. See id. at 811. ("water, unsevered expressly by conveyance or reservation, is part of
the surface estate"); Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 293, 276 S.W.2d 798, 802
(1955) (surface owner can use and sell all percolating water he captures from wells on his
land); Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 28-29, 296 S.W. 273, 278 (1927) (overflow of spring
the source of which was subterranean stream is property of surface owner capturing same);
Tax. WATER CODE ANN. § 52.002 (Vernon 1972) (ownership of underground water by landowner). But see Bartley v. Sone, 527 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rule that surface owner owns underground water held inapplicable to water
flowing in subterranean stream or to overflow of rivers); Ambassador Oil Corp. v. Robertson,
384 S.W.2d 752, 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (mineral reservation
includes salt water as a mineral); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 52.001(3) (Vernon 1972) ("underground water" means certain percolating waters but not subterranean streams or river
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sion exists, however, among jurisdictions over the meaning of the term

"minerals" and what a mineral estate includes.2 9 The intention of the
parties to a conveyance is deemed determinative of the specific minerals

included.3 1 Under the majority rule, the term mineral, when used alone,
includes oil and gas unless there is a demonstrated intention to the contrary.3 1 The minority rule, however, requires a demonstrated intention to
32
include oil and gas in the term mineral.
Under the four corners rule of construction, 3 the intention of the par-

ties determines whether a grant or conveyance of "oil, gas and other minerals" includes coal or lignite." The question of inclusion becomes critical

underflow). See also Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. Civ.
App.- Amarillo 1960, writ refd n.r.e.) (quoting Marquette Cement Mining Co. v. Oglesby
Coal Co., 253 F. 107, 111 (N.D. Ill. 1918) (surface ownership includes "not merely the top of
the glacial drift, soil, or agricultural surface," but also some substances regarded as minerals
other than oil and gas).
29. Compare Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 549 (N.D. 1973) (coal included in
conveyance of minerals) and Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 378
S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex. 1964) ("minerals" includes oil and gas) with Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal
Co., 293 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (coal not included in a conveyance of minerals) and Detlor v. Holland, 49 N.E. 690, 692-93 (Ohio 1898) ("minerals" does not include oil
and gas).
30. See Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 583, 136 S.W.2d
800, 805 (1940). See generally 2 R. DEVLIN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND DEEDS §§ 835,
836 (3d ed. 1911); 1 E. KuNTz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 16.1 (1962).
31. Murray v. Allard, 43 S.W. 355, 357 (Tenn. 1897); see, e.g., Roth v. Huser, 76 P.2d
871, 875 (Kan. 1938) (majority rule holding "minerals" includes oil and gas); Southland
Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex. 1964) (majority rule holding "minerals" includes oil and gas as a matter of law); Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v.
Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 582, 136 S.W.2d 800, 805 (1940) (under majority rule "minerals"
includes oil and gas). See generally 1 E. Kurz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS §
13.3, at 300 (1962). The majority rule has been followed in Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and "possibly in" Louisiana and Mississippi. Id. at 303.
32. See Detlor v. Holland, 49 N.W. 690, 692-93 (Ohio 1898) (oil and gas not included in
grant of minerals); Dunham & Shortt v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 44 (1882) (petroleum not
included in reservation of minerals). See generally 1 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
OIL AND GAS § 13.3, at 300 (1962). The minority rule has been followed in Arkansas, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania. Id. at 300-03.
33. The four corners rule states:
When the instrument by its terms plainly and clearly discloses the intention of the
parties, or is phrased in language not fairly susceptible of more than one interpretation, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained by the court as a matter of law
from the language used in the writing and without aid from evidence as to the attending circumstances.
Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 583, 136 S.W.2d 800, 805 (1940).
34. See, e.g., id. at 805; Colquitt v. Eureka Producing Co., 63 S.W.2d 1018, 1021 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1933, judgmt adopted); Chandler v. Hartt, 467 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). If after applying the four corners rule of construction to
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when minerals unnamed in the conveyance subsequently become valuable."5 Absent ambiquity or language showing the parties meant to limit
the meaning of "mineral," courts will not consider extrinsic evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the deed's execution.s The characteristics of the substance at issue, however, may be considered in determining whether the particular unnamed substance was included in the
conveyance.37 Texas courts have applied four factors when considering
the particular characteristics of the substance: the natural meaning of the
word "minerals";3s the unique value of the particular substance;89 the re-

a deed, the intent remains undiscernable, the doubt is generally construed against the grantor. Farmers Canal Co. v. Potthast, 587 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 95, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1957);
Allen v. Creighton, 131 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1939, writ ref'd). The
intention of the parties "is to be ascertained from a consideration of all the language which
appears in the deed, and by harmonizing, if possible, those provisions which appear to be in
conflict." Farmers Canal Co. v. Potthast, 587 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1979, writ refd n.r.e.); accord, McMahon v. Christmann, 157 Tex. 403, 407, 303
S.W.2d 341, 344 (1957). See generally Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 112 (1949); Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant or Reservation of
"Oil, Gas, or Other Minerals'?,30 Sw. L.J. 481, 483 (1976).
35. Is coal included in a conveyance of "oil, gas, and other minerals"? Compare
Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 549 (N.D. 1973) (yes) and Adams County v. Smith,
23 N.W.2d 873, 875 (N.D. 1946) (yes) with Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., 293 N.E.2d 510,
514 (Ind.Ct. App. 1973) (no) and Wulf v. Shultz, 508 P.2d 896, 900 (Kan. 1973) (no) and
MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36, 43 (N.D. 1957) (no).
36. See, e.g., Texas Elec. Ry. v. Neale, 151 Tex. 526, 534, 252 S.W.2d 451, 456 (1952);
Remington Rand, Inc. v. Sugarland Indus., 137 Tex. 409, 421, 153 S.W.2d 477, 483 (1941);
Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. BruhImeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 583, 136 S.W.2d 800, 805 (1940).
See generally Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant or Reservation of "Oil, Gas, or Other
Minerals'?,30 Sw. L.J. 481, 483 (1976).
37. See Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
After stating the deed was not ambiguous and that surrounding circumstances could not be
considered, the Williford court went on to allow evidence of the method of extraction. Id. at
131. Due to the surface destructive method of extraction coal was deemed not to be included
as a mineral. See id. at 131. But cf. DuBois v. Jacobs, 551 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (evidence as to presence or absence of specific minerals not
essential to construction of deed). See generally Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant or
Reservation of "Oil, Gas, or Other Minerals"?, 30 Sw. L.J. 481, 483 (1976).
The doctrine of "ejudem generis" has been virtually ignored in Texas as a rule of construction to glean the parties intent in a mineral deed. See Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan
Am. Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex. 1964). Under the doctrine, the term "other
minerals" acquires meaning only when used in connection with certain, specific minerals,
and the meaning is determined by the enumerated minerals. See id. at 54; Luse v. Boatman,
217 S.W. 1096, 1099 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, writ ref'd).
38. The natural meaning test looks at the meaning of the term "minerals" as used by
the mining industry, the commercial world, and landowners. Fleming Foundation v. Texaco,
Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see e.g., Heinatz
v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 944, 997 (1949) (limestone not included in devise of
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lation of the substance to the surface; 0 and the necessity of destroying
the surface in removing the substance from the land."'
Illustrative of the aforementioned factors is the case of Heinatz v. Allen'2 in which the devise of "mineral rights" was held not to include
limestone and building stone.48 Since there was no language in the will
manifesting an intent to use the words "mineral rights" in the technical
or scientific sense, the court interpreted the words according to their natural and ordinary meaning." Furthermore, the limestone and building
stone were deemed not to have any unique value since they could be used
only for road construction; and being so closely related to the surface, the
substances were considered part of the soil.' 5 Finally, determinative of,
but not decisive of whether the substances were minerals, was the fact
that the only way of removing them was by surface destructive methods."
A recent decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court'1 relied on the Texas
cases of Heinatz and Atwood v. Rodman" to determine whether limes"mineral rights"); Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Psencik v. Wessels 205 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1947, writ ref'd) ("grant of minerals" does not include sand and gravel). But see Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e) (natural meaning test applied to gravel but not to coal).
39. The unique value test considers minerals to be those substances having special
value apart from the surface. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 518, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997
(1949); cf. Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. 1973) (salt
water could be mineral if of such value or character as to be useful).
40. The relation to the surface test considers whether the substance is so close to the
surface as to be part of the use and enjoyment of the surface. See Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex.
512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949); cf. Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)
(controlling factor, under surface destruction test, is "close physical relationship").
41. The surface destruction test entitles the surface owner to any substance the extraction of which depletes the surface. See, e.g., Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980);
Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd on other grounds 597 S.W.2d 743
(Tex. 1980)); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352-53 (Tex. 1971). See generally Comment,
Lignite - Surface or Mineral? The Single Test Causes Double Trouble, 28 BAYLOR L. REV.
287, 290 (1976); Comment, Lignite: Surface or Mineral - The Surface Destruction Test
and More, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 879, 888 (1977); Comment, Surface or Mineral: A Single
Test?, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 407, 413-14 (1971).
42. 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
43. Id. at 523, 217 S.W.2d at 1000; accord, Southern Title Ins. Co. v. Oller, 595 S.W.2d
681, 682-83 (Ark. 1980) (citing Heinatz as authority and applying the natural meaning,
unique value, and surface destruction tests to find limestone not a mineral).
44. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949).
45. Id. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at 997.
46. Id. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at 998.
47. Southern Title Ins. Co. v. Oiler, 595 S.W.2d 681, 682-83 (Ark. 1980).
48. 355 S.W.2d 206, 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A conveyance
of "oil, gas, and other minerals" was deemed not to include limestone, caliche, and surface
shale that could have been profitably sold for making cement and, therefore, possessed of
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tone is a mineral. 49 The court expressly stated a determination of mineral
rights entails consideration of the surface destruction factor as well as the
value and commercial profitability of the substance, local custom and usage, and the parties' intent.50 Though limestone was being profitably
mined in the area,51 the court held that because limestone is generally
removed by surface destructive methods and there was no evidence chalk
or limestone was generally known in the area as a mineral, the limestone
52
was not a mineral.
A leading Texas case on construing the language of mineral conveyances is Acker v. Guinn.58 In Acker the court addressed the issue of
whether the mineral grant included iron ore.5 4 Absent an affirmative intention to the contrary, the court ruled the instrument should not be construed to include a substance that must be removed by surface destructive methods.5 5 The court balanced three factors in determining the iron
ore was part of the surface estate: relation of the iron ore to the surface;
methods of extraction; and the effect of production upon the surface."

special value. Id. at 216. Although its holding was in accord with Heinatz, the Atwood court
considered the unique value test as applied in Heinatz to be obiter dictum. Id. at 216. Since
Atwood adjudged the limestone in the particular circumstances as not of exceptional or rare
character, it is apparent the Atwood court did not reject the unique value test itself, but
merely considered the test outweighed by the surface destruction factor. See Comment, Is
Coal Included in a Grant or Reservation of "Oil, Gas, or Other Minerals"?, 30 Sw. L.J. 481,
486 (1976).
49. Southern Title Ins. Co. v. Oiler, 595 S.W.2d 681, 682-83 (Ark. 1980).
50. Id. at 684.
51. Id. at 683.
52. See id. at 684 (limestone approximately fifty feet below surface). The exclusionary
cause of the title insurance policy on the tract was found not to except title defects due to a
reservation of an interest in chalk deposits. The title insurance was restricted to coverage
for "mineral leased or reserved," although there was a recorded reservation of a 1/2interest
in the chalk deposits. The court concluded chalk was the equivalent of limestone. See id. at
682.
53. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
54. See id. at 349.
55. See id. at 352. See generally Clark, Uranium Problems, 18 TEx. B.J. 505, 540
(1955).
56. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352-53 (Tex. 1971). Undisputed in Acker was the
fact the only way to produce the iron ore was by open pit or strip mining methods. Id. at
351; see Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex. 1977) (Greenhill, C.J., concurring) (rev'd
on other grounds 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)). In 1975, after Acker, the Texas Legislature passed the Texas Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 5920-10 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977) (current version at art. 5920-11 (Vernon Supp.
1980)). Pursuant to the dictates of the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977, the Texas law was amended. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1977); TEx. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5920-11 (Vernon Supp. 1980). The Texas Act requires surface miners to
restore the land to an equivalent of, or better than, pre-mining status after removal of minerals, with strict standards of topographical restoration and revegetation being set forth. See
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Although the court cited Heinatz as precedent,"7 the Acker surface destruction test overlooks the Heinatz natural meaning and unique value
criteria. 8
Prior to 1977 the only cases dealing with the question of whether the
term "minerals" included coal applied the Acker surface destruction
test.59 In Williford v. Spies,60 the Waco Court of Civil Appeals reasoned a
conveyance of "oil, gas and other minerals" did not include coal since the
parties could not have intended to define "minerals" as a substance which
had to be removed by surface destructive methods.6 ' In DuBois v. Jacobs, " the Austin Court of Civil Appeals addressed the issue of whether
reservation of an undivided one-half non-participating royalty of all oil,
gas, and/or other minerals included any sand, gravel, coal, or lignite. 8
Applying reasoning similar to that relied upon in Williford, the court
held the mineral reservation did not include any substance which must be
removed by surface destructive methods, absent an express intent to the
contrary."'
Acker was affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court 6s in the first appeal of
Reed v. Wylie. 6 At issue in Reed was whether an interest in coal and

lignite had been reserved to the grantor in a reservation "in and to all oil,
gas and other minerals on and under the land and premises.
The test
formulated by the court required the surface owner to prove "as of the
date of the instrument being construed, if the substance near the surface
had been extracted, that extraction would necessarily have consumed or
depleted the surface."68 The majority holding, therefore, required the sur-

id.
57. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1971).
58. See id. at 352. Compare id. at 352 (considering relation to surface, methods of ex-

traction, and effect of production on surface) with Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 523, 217

S.W.2d 994, 997-98 (1949) (considering natural meaning, unique value, relation to surface,

and surface destruction).
59. DuBois v. Jacobs, 551 S.W.2d 147, 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ); Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ). See generally 15
Hous. L. REv. 187, 190 (1977).
60. 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).

61. See id. at 130.
62. 551 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
63. Id. at 149.

64. See id. at 150.
65. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd on other grounds 597
S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980)) (holding the Acker rule controlled the interpretation of the

instrument "as to the same substance at all depths").
66. Id. at 172.
67. Id. at 170.
68. The case was remanded to determine the depth at which the lignite was located and
to prove whether extraction of the lignite would have destroyed the surface. Id. at 173. In
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face owner to show the only method of extracting the minerals would
have destroyed the surface."e The dissenting opinion argued the controlling principle of Acker had been the iron ore's relation to the surface
rather than the surface destructive method of removal. In addition, the
Acker opinion stated the surface estate owns lignite if it lies at the surface.71 Furthermore, Acker does not require the surface owner to prove
the extraction method, envisioned at the time of the deed, would necessarily have destroyed the surface."
Subsequent to Reed v. Wylie I, the Tyler Court of Civil Appeals in
Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co. 7 3 was presented with the question

whether coal was included in a reservation of "all of the oil, gas, uranium,
and other minerals and gravel in, on and under the land. '7 The mineral
owners, relying on the Acker and Reed I surface destruction tests, 5

Acker the Texas Supreme Court applied the surface destruction test to a form of mineral
extraction wherein the surface must be destroyed and formulated a rule to be applied
thereto. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971). In Reed I, the court construed the
specific and limited rule of Acker to be an "if" rule: if the surface must be destroyed, the
minerals belong to the surface. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd
597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980)). In Reed one of the reasonable methods of extracting the coal
in question was strip mining. See id. at 173-74 (Greenhill, C.J., concurring). As Justice
Greenhill stated, "[iun Acker v. Guinn, therefore, this Court did not decide the question of
whether a substance passes as a mineral if that substance may be, but does not have to be,
mined by surface destroying methods." Id. at 174 (Greenhill, C.J., concurring).
69. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd 597 S.W.2d 743, 747
(Tex. 1980)).
70. See id. at 175 (Daniel, J., dissenting). Justice Daniel's stance was adopted in the
majority opinion in Reed H. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980).
71. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 175 (Tex. 1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (aff'd 597
S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)).
72. Id. at 175 (Daniel, J., dissenting). In Reed H Justice Daniel also prevailed on this
point. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980).
73. Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. See id. at 194. A coal and lignite leaseholder had obtained a lease from the surface
estate owner and at trial argued: "(1) the coal and lignite were not specifically reserved; (2)
the minerals were so near the surface of the land that they could only be produced or recovered by strip mining;" and (3) the deed failed to give the grantor the right to strip mine the
substances. Id. at 194. The mineral estate owners argued coal and lignite are minerals, and
since gravel and uranium must be mined by surface destructive methods, the deed affirmatively showed the parties intention to allow the destruction of the surface estate to remove
all minerals, including unnamed minerals such as coal and lignite. Id. at 195. After considering detailed evidence as to the location of the lignite and the methods of production capable
of extracting the substances, the court stated as of the date of the deed, 71% of the lignite
underlying the tract could only have been extracted through surface mining. Id. at 195.
75. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd in part 597 S.W.2d 743,
747 (Tex. 1980)); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971). The Reed court stated:
If the instrument had specifically reserved coal and lignite, or if the conveyance had
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sought to prove the deed's inclusion of gravel and uranium, substances
whose removal may be surface destructive, affirmatively expressed the
parties' intent to allow surface destruction when removing all reserved
substances. 70 The mineral owners argued coal and lignite were, therefore,
reserved mineral substances.77 Gravel, however, was held not to be a mineral based upon the natural meaning test of Heinatz.7s As such, a reservation of gravel was not considered to have any probative value in determining whether any other substance was included in the reservation of
"other minerals." Regarding the deed's inclusion of uranium, the mineral owners failed to prove the uranium was so near the surface that it
must have been extracted by surface destructive methods.6 0 Furthermore,
even if the mineral owners had presented sufficient proof, coal could not
pass as a mineral because reasonable use of the surface, by the uranium
owners, is not determinative of ownership of another unnamed

substance.81

expressly reserved all minerals lying upon the surface or at any depth and including
those minerals which may be produced by open pit or strip mining, the intention and
effect of the instrument would have been clearly expressed.
Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd on other grounds 597 S.W.2d 743, 747
(Tex. 1980)). The Acker court stated:
Unless the contrary intention is affirmatively and fairly expressed, therefore, a grant
or reservation of "minerals" or "mineral rights" should not be construed to include a
substance that must be removed by methods that will, in effect, consume or deplete
the surface estate.
Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
76. Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
77. Id. at 195.
78. Id. at 197; cf. San Jacinto Sand Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 426 S.W.2d 338,
346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (sand and gravel not minerals), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969); Watkins v. Certain-Teed Prod. Corp., 231 S.W.2d
981, 985 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, no writ), (sand and gravel not minerals because
possessed of no peculiar value).
79. Riddlesperger v. Cresslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80. Id. at 197. The court's statement adhered to the reasoning in Reed I; however, Reed
H overruled the must requirement and allowed a showing that any reasonable method of
extraction would destroy the surface to show an intent to regard a substance as part of the
surface estate. Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980).
81. Cf. Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (ownership of an unnamed substance not to be based on right
of reasonable use of surface in removing expressly reserved substance). In Sheffield v. Gibbs
Bros. & Co., 596 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ) the mandates of Reed I were also construed. Coal was held not to be included in a reservation of "all
of the minerals and mineral rights, except sand, gravel and stone." Id. at 230. Relying on
Reed I and Acker, the court stated the intention to include coal and lignite within the
meaning of the words "minerals" must be affirmatively and fairly expressed. Id. at 230. A
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In Reed v. Wylie 1182 the Texas Supreme Court squarely faced the issue
of what is meant by at the surface for purposes of delimiting a mineral
reservation. 88 The court defined at the surface to be "a depth shallow
enough that it must have been contemplated that its removal would be by
a surface destructive method."" The court overruled Reed I in part, by
requiring the surface owner to establish at the time extraction was

planned, rather than at the time of the deed's execution, whether any
reasonable method of removing the near surface substance would consume, deplete, or destroy the surface. 5 Further established by Reed II,

conclusive presumption arises that there was no intention to grant surface coal and lignite
in a mineral grant, absent an affirmative statement to the contrary. Id. at 229. The court,
therefore, approached a standard that coal and lignite are not "minerals" as a matter of law.
Cf. id. at 229 (reservation of mineral rights conclusively presumes ownership of coal and
lignite). The mineral estate owners argued the deed listed and excepted exclusively the substances whose removal would destroy the surface and which were to be classed part of surface ownership, that is, sand, gravel, and stone; therefore, any other minerals whose removal
would destroy the surface belonged to the mineral owner. See id. at 229. The court, implicitly relying on a natural meaning test, rejected the mineral owners' argument and stated
sand, gravel, and stone are not usually considered minerals. Id. at 229. An inference exists,
therefore, that all other "substances," an apparent reference to matter not usually classed as
minerals, whose removal would destroy the surface are included in the term "minerals." See
id. at 229. The converse, however, is not necessarily true since all minerals whose removal
would destroy the surface are not included in the mineral estate absent a showing to the
contrary in the deed. Cf. id. at 229 (conclusive presumption arises there is no intent to
include coal and lignite in a conveyance of minerals). Since a fact issue remained whether
the coal and lignite in question lay so near the surface that their extraction must destroy the
surface, the case was reversed and remanded. Id. at 230.
82. 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
83. See id. at 744. The court was provided with the depth of the lignite and held as a
matter of law the lignite was at the surface. Id. at 744.
84. Id. at 76. The court implied the parties must have had some actual or constructive
notice the coal was so close to the surface it would have to be removed by strip mining.
Notice apparently was present due to the outcropping of lignite in a gully on the tract and
in the general area of the county. See id. at 745.
85. Id. at 747. The Reed I court required the surface owner to prove the surface would
be substantially destroyed by removing substantialquantities of the substance. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd on other grounds 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex.
1980)). The withdrawn and superseded opinion of Reed I required the surface owner to
show the surface would be substantially destroyed in removing commercially producible
quantitiesof a substance. Reed v. Wylie, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 327, 329 (May 25, 1977), withdrawn and superseded, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977). The Reed II opinion did not expressly
overrule the substantial quantity test of the final Reed I opinion. See Reed v. Wylie, 597
S.W.2d 743, 746-49 (Tex. 1980). A presumption, therefore, arises that the surface owner
must prove substantial destruction would occur in removing substantial quantities of a substance. Regardless of the quantities involved, the surface owner must prove that removal of
the substance would substantially destroy the surface. Cf. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169,
172 (Tex. 1977) (substantial destruction from removal of substantial quantities must be
proven by surface owner) (rev'd on other grounds 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)).
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ownership will run to whatever depth the substance can be found once
the surface owner proves ownership of the substance at or near the surface.86 The majority rejected the lower court's requirement that to be considered at the surface the substance must outcrop on the particular tract
in question, rather than merely in the immediate vicinity.6 7 The court
reasoned proof of an outcropping within a half mile of the Reed tract and
in a creekbed on the Reed tract was sufficient to meet the Acker test for
determining at the surface.86
Justice Spears, in a concurring opinion, advocated the need for a new
rule allowing ownership of the substance in question to be determined
from the instrument alone, rather than from ascertaining facts relative to
each tract.89 He delineated four rules,90 stating any one would be fairer
than the majority's rule because ownership of the substance could be determined as a matter of law, rather than on extrinsic evidence pertaining
to characteristics of the substance and methods of its removal.' 1

86. Id. at 748. This rule was taken from Reed I at 172. No precedent existed for so
stating. For an analysis of the problems created by such a rule, see Comment, Lignite: Surface or Mineral-The Surface Destruction Test and More, 29 BAYLoR L. REv. 879, 898
(1977). The Reed II court ruled deposits within two hundred feet of the surface are near
surface as a matter of law. Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980). The court's
conclusion was based upon the fact that current technology can strip mine lignite down to
that depth. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 180 ('ex. 1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting)
(rev'd on other grounds 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)). Lignite occurs in Texas to depths
of five thousand feet. See id. at 180 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
87. Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980).
88. The court said the inability to see lignite on the surface would not preclude finding
a substance existed at surface. See id. at 746, 748. The only evidence of at surface substances in Acker was an outcropping within one mile of the 681/2 acre tract. Id. at 748. In
Reed II proof of an outcropping within one half mile of the tract in question and in a
creekbed therein was sufficient to establish the coal to be at surface. See id. at 748.
89. See id. at 750 (Spears, J., concurring). Justice Spears recognized at least four possible fact issues which must be resolved to determine ownership of lignite under the rationale
of the majority: "(1) are there deposits in the 'reasonably immediate vicinity'; (2) are there
deposits 'at or near' the surface; (3) must the deposits conform generally to the earth's surface as suggested by Acker; and (4) what is a 'reasonable' method of recovery?" Id. at 750
(Spears, J., concurring).
90. Construing minerals according to the natural meaning without regard to extraction
methods and limiting the mineral owner to reasonable use of the surface is one possible rule.
Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 750 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring). Another rule would
give coal and lignite to the surface owner as a matter of law, regardless of depth and method
of production of the substances. Id. at 750 (Spears, J., concurring). A third rule would not
include coal and lignite as minerals as a matter of law. Id. at 750-51 (Spears, J., concurring).
Lastly, the mineral estate owner in a grant of "oil, gas and other minerals" would be entitled
to substances extractable by underground methods only as long as he used the surface in a
reasonably necessary manner. Id. at 751 (Spears, J., concurring). See generally Kuntz, The
Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 115 (1949).
91. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 751 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring).
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Although the particular facts and circumstances of Reed II were addressed as an at the surface issue, the court reexamined Reed I relative to
a near surface substance. 2 In ruling the surface owner need only prove a
reasonable method, rather than the only method, of removal would destroy the surface," the court expressly stated the controlling factor in a
near surface issue is the substance's relation to the surface.9 " The court,
therefore, has deflated the importance of the surface destruction test,
while keeping it of crucial concern, s 5 and revived the relation to the surface test espoused in Heinatz but overlooked in Reed L" Left to be resolved is whether the unique value of a particular substance and/or the
natural meaning of the word "minerals" are also to be revived and considered, as in Heinatz, in a determination of what "minerals" means in a
97

conveyance.

Relying on Heinatz and Atwood, the Arkansas Supreme Court recently
balanced a local custom and usage factor" with the surface destruction
factor against the unique value factor."9 The Texas Supreme Court, on
the other hand, has inconsistently applied the Heinatz criteria as a result
of their decision in Acker. 1°0 Acker cited Heinatz but only in regard to

92. See id. at 746-48.
93. Id. at 747.
94. Id. at 747.
95. See id. at 747.
96. Compare id. at 750 (relation to surface controlling) and Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex.
512, 517-19, 217 S.W.2d 994, 995-96 (1949) ("minerals" to be determined by substance's
nature, relation to the surface, value, and method of extraction) with Reed v. Wylie, 554
S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)) (surface owner must
prove removal of near surface substance would necessarily have depleted surface) and Acker
v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (unless contrary intention affirmatively and fairly
expressed, conveyance of "minerals" does not include substances that must be removed by
surface destructive methods).
97. See Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517-18, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949). See generally Comment, Lignite: Surface or Mineral - The Surface Destruction Test and More, 29
BAYLOR L. REv. 879, 892-94 (1977); Comment, Lignite-Surface or Mineral? The Single Test
Causes Double Trouble, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 287, 288-89 (1976); Comment, Surface or Mineral: A Single Test?, 23 BAYLOR L. REv. 407, 415 (1971).
98. The local custom and usage factor is nothing more than the natural meaning factor.
Compare Southern Title Ins. Co. v. Oiler, 595 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Ark. 1980) (considering
whether at any time chalk or limestone was generally known in the area as a mineral) with
Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (meaning of "minerals'l entails considering the vernacular of the mining
industry, the commercial world, and the landowners).
99. See Southern Title Ins. Co. v. Oiler, 595 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Ark. 1980).
100. Compare Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980) (considering surface destruction factor and relation to surface factor) with Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172
(Tex. 1977) (considering surface destruction factor) (modified 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex.
1980)) and Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1971) (considering surface destruction
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the latter's consideration of the natural meaning and surface destruction
tests.10 1 Acker then espoused a rule dependent upon relation to the surface and surface destruction factors,102 disregarding Heinatz's natural
meaning and unique value tests.108 The Acker test was subsequently adhered to in both Reed opinions.' " Reed II, therefore, bases ownership of
a substance near the surface upon the method of production and whether
that method will deplete, consume, or destroy the surface.108 As considered in the Reed I dissent, title examiners still cannot glean from the
conveying instrument who owns coal or lignite. 106 Factual analysis, therefore, is mandated on a tract by tract basis to consider depth of the lignite
and mode of extraction.10 7 Applying the test adopted by Reed II, the general intent of the parties is not considered worthy of attention, but rather
the specific intent of the parties in considering a mode of production is
paramount.1 08 Were the courts to return to the natural meaning and
unique value factors as additional concerns, 100 the general intent of the
parties would be of utmost concern leading to increased faith in the law
as well as certainty in land titles.1
Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, addressing the issue of reasonable use of the
surface, held the mineral leaseholder has the right to damage the surface

and relation to surface factor) and Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517-19, 217 S.W.2d 994,
997 (1949) (considering natural meaning, unique value, relation to surface, and surface destruction factors).
101. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1971).
102. Id. at 352. The court held the ore was similar to limestone and gravel, which are
surface estate substances, because of the ore's relation to the surface, extraction methods,
and mining effects on the surface. Id. at 352.
103. Id. at 352.
104. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980); Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d
169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd in part 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)).
105. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980).
106. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 179 (Tex. 1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (rev'd
on other grounds 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)).
107. Id. at 178 (Daniel, J., dissenting); accord, Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas
in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 114 (1949) (consideration of factual setting requires title examiner to apprise himself of local folklore).
108. Cf. Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980) (ownership dependent on surface destruction in removing substance). See also Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas
in Wyoming, 3 Wvo. L.J. 107, 112 (1949).
109. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949) (unique value determined by special value of substance apart from land); Fleming Foundation v. Texaco,
Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (natural meaning
determined by mining world, commercial world, and landowners).
110. Indeed, in Reed I the court noted mineral ores, coal, and lignite would ordinarily
be reserved to the mineral estate in a conveyance of "oil, gas and other minerals," but that
Acker mandated consideration of the surface destruction test. See Reed v. Wylie, 554
S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (rev'd on other grounds 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)).
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to extract minerals, if there is only one available manner of use of the
surface."' It has been advocated that strip mining is a reasonably necessary use of the surface when no alternative exists.' An additional concern is presented, however, by the underlying rationale of Acker that
upon a severance of minerals from his tract the surface owner does not
normally intend conveying the right to destroy the surface.118 By affirming the Acker rationale," the Texas Supreme Court has failed to distinguish affirmatively between determination of ownership of minerals
and reasonable use of the surface by the mineral estate.",5 Getty and Sun
Oil applied the surface destruction test in interpreting reasonably necessary use of the surface after ownership had been established; whereas,
Acker, Reed I, and Reed H determined ownership based upon methods of
production, such as surface destruction."' One commentator has indicated the court in Reed I, rather than limiting the implied easements in
the conveyance of a substance, limited the conveyance of the substance, if
extraction of the substance required surface destructive methods.'" The
decision in Reed H reaches a substantially identical conclusion.'1 8 Reed
II, therefore, impliedly treats ownership of minerals and reasonable use of
the surface as interwoven and integrated issues. '

111. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971).
112. See Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Ky. 1968); Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant Reservation of "Oil, Gas, or Other Minerals"?, 30 Sw.
L.J. 481, 498 (1976). But see Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wvo.
L.J. 107, 115 (1949) (strip mining an unreasonable use entitling surface owner to compensation); cf. Smith v. Moore, 474 P.2d 794, 795 (Colo. 1970) (en banc) (absent expression to
contrary, mineral estate may not injure or destroy surface).
113. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971). The Acker court failed to
discuss what operations would be considered destructive of the surface. See id. at 352.
114. See id. at 352.
115. Cf. Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980) (not addressing issue); Reed v.
Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (dispensing with issue of ownership versus use because Acker did not address it) (rev'd on other grounds 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)).
116. Compare Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980) (ownership dependent
on effect of reasonable extraction methods upon surface) and Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d
348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (ownership extended to substances whose removal must destroy surface) with Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810-11 (Tex. 1972) (reasonable use of
surface when no reasonable alternative existed) and Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618,
622 (Tex. 1971) (unreasonable use of surface when surface rights not given due regard).
117. Comment, Lignite: Surface or Mineral-The Surface Destruction Test and More,
29 BAYLOR L. REV. 879, 894-95 (1977); see Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977)
(rev'd on other grounds 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)).
118. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980).
119. Compare id. at 747 (surface ownership includes substances whose removal involves
destruction of surface by any reasonable method) and Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172
(Tex. 1977) (surface ownership includes substance whose removal necessarily involves surface destruction) (rev'd 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)) and Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d
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The need for the Texas Supreme Court to expressly state whether ownership and reasonable use are integral or separate issues is manifested in
the holding of Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co. The Riddlesperger
court attempted to follow Reed I and Acker but was unable to discern the
implied holding in Reed I that ownership and use are integral.120 The
Riddlesperger rationale, distinguishing mineral ownership from reasonable use of the surface, was correct.12 1 Furthermore, had the Riddlesperger
court applied the natural meaning factor of Heinatz to coal and lignite, as
it did to gravel, 122 the court would have found coal and lignite to be minerals and then would have mandated the mineral estate reasonably use
the surface estate in the extraction of the coal. 2 ' Negotiations between
the parties and the purchase of the right to strip mine, if underground
mining was neither feasible nor reasonable,
would aid in preventing un12
wanted or unnecessary surface damage. 4
Another dilemna created by the Reed II opinion's failure to distinguish

348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (a substance which must be removed by surface destruction is part of
surface ownership) with Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Tex. 1972) (when
using surface mineral owner need not consider alternatives available on adjacent land) and
Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971) (mineral owner must use reasonably
necessary methods to carry out purpose of mineral conveyance).
120. Compare Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (simply because a reasonable use of the surface in extracting an expressly reserved mineral would destroy surface does not mean ownership of an
unnamed substance is based on reasonable use of the expressly reserved mineral) with Reed
v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980) (surface ownership includes near surface substances whose removal destroys surface by any reasonable method) and Reed v. Wylie, 554
S.W.2d 169, 17t (Tex. 1977) (surface ownership includes near surface substances whose removal necessarily destroys surface) (rev'd 597 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. 1980)).
121. Cf. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Tex. 1972) (determining reasonable use of surface after ownership had been established); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470
S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971) (determining reasonable use of surface when ownership not at
issue).
122. Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
123. Cf. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971) (mineral owner must
use reasonably necessary methods to carry out purpose of mineral ownership).
124. Cf. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Tex. 1972) (mineral owner
justified in using surface estate as reasonably necessary to carry out mineral lease purposes
when no reasonable alternative exists); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex.
1971) (mineral owner must reasonably use surface with due regard for rights of surface owner). Because the mineral owner must comply with rigid standards of land restoration in
accordance with the Texas Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, the interests of the surface
owner in preserving the surface are met. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-11 (Vernon
Supp. 1980). One commentator has stated the mineral owner should reimburse the surface
owner for the fair market rental value of the property from the time surface mining starts
until reclamation is accomplished. See Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant or Reservation of "Oil, Gas, or Other Minerals"?, 30 Sw. L.J. 481, 504 (1976).
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between ownership and reasonable use is the mineral owner's loss of
deep-basin lignite from tracts having near surface coal deposits.'" Apparently, unconsidered by the Texas Supreme Court in both Reed opinions
was the potential for production of deep-basin lignite by in situ gasification methods presently employed by the Soviet Union.126 It is doubtful
17
deep-basin lignite will be mined in the near future due to high costs;
however, the country's need for energy independence mandates a rule of
law allowing production of deep-basin coal irrespective of ownership of
near surface coal.1 28 One commentator has stated that whether deep-basin
lignite is included under "oil, gas, and other minerals" conveyances
should be decided by a separate rule, rather than by one developed to
determine ownership of near surface lignite.1"'

125. Cf. Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980) (once surface owner establishes
ownership of at surface or near surface substances, he owns lignite, coal or ore at whatever
depth it may be found); Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (once instrument is
construed to give surface estate near surface substances, the particular substance at
whatever depth, is not a mineral) (afr'd 597 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980)). Lignite is deposited near the surface and in deep-basin deposits throughout the Texas Gulf Coast. Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant or Reservation of "Oil, Gas, or Other Minerals"?, 30 Sw.
L.J. 481, 492 (1976). The most prevelant deep-basin lignites are situated in Bastrop, Fayette, Houston, Lee, Leon, and Madison Counties. Id. at 492.
126. See Edgar, The Potential of in Situ Gasification for Texas Lignite, in PROCEEDINGS, GULF COAST LIGNITE CONFERENCE: GEOLOGY, UTILIZATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS

131, 137 (W. Kaiser ed. 1978). A geometric pattern of vertical bores spaced 50 to 100 feet
apart or long horizontal boreholes tap the deposit seam. Gasification occurs between the
boreholes, and offtake holes bring the deep coal to surface. Id. at 132.
Underground coal gasification (UCG) has as its objective the recovery of the energetic
and chemical content of coal without mining. A gaseous mixture composed of nitrogen, oxygen, steam and carbon dioxide in variable proportions is introduced in a coal
seam prepared for gasification: combustion and gasification reactions occur in situ.
The products carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, hydrogen, water, vapor, methane, nitrogen, and other hydrocarbons are obtained in a readily usable form for the production of electric power or the manufacture of chemicals.
Id. at 131.
127. Mintz, Strip Mining: A Policy Evaluation,5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461', 472-77 (1976). The
average cost differential "between surface and underground coal mining occurring in Central
U.S. and Appalachia are in the range of $3.00 to $5.00 per ton." Id. at 473. The total savings
from surface mining coal rather than by other methods may increase by two-thirds in the
next decade, since the higher underground mining labor costs "increase at a higher rate than
capital and material costs." Id. at 476-77.
128. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON COAL, ACCEPTABLE WAYS TO HASTEN THE SUBSTITUTION OF
COAL FOR OIL: AN INTERIM REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON COAL (1979). The commission urges the reconversion of coal-capable electrical boilers now burning oil and gas to
burn coal. Id. at 7. See also Brownell, Energy Independence - The Return to Coal, Constraints on Production and Utilization of Our Most Abundant National Energy Resource,
11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 677, 679 (1980).
129. 15 Hous. L. REV. 187, 198 (1977).
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Texas lignite resources capable of being extracted by surface mining
have been estimated at 10.3 billion tons, the equivalent of 28 billion barrels of oil in BTU output. 8 0 There may be up to 100 billion tons of deepbasin lignite in Texas - equivalent to 277 billion barrels of oil in BTU
output.131 In addition, Texas has been ranked third behind New Mexico
and Wyoming in uranium reserves.8 2 The need, therefore, for a uniform,
easily applied rule of construction to effectuate the intent of the parties
in a conveyance of "minerals" cries out. Furthermore, a revival of the
natural meaning and unique value tests in addition to consideration of
the surface destruction and relation to the surface tests, would classify
many substances, particularly coal and lignite, as minerals, as a matter of
law. Ownership should not be determined by methods of production. 33
To the contrary, ownership should be determined as a matter of law without tract by tract factual determinations.1 3 4 Once ownership is established, the determination of whether a reasonable method of extracting
the substances is destructive of the surface can be made through the reasonable use and accomodation of estates doctrines of Getty and Sun
Oil.18 As demonstrated by Riddlesperger, the Texas appellate courts are
involved in overburdening factual determinations which must be construed in light of perplexing law.18 6 The Supreme Court of Texas has yet
to establish an uncomplicated test to determine mineral ownership which

130. Brummett & O'Donovan, Technology and Economics of Mining Texas Lignite, in
PROCEEDINGS, GULF COAST LIGNITE CONFERENCE: GEOLOGY, UTILIZATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL

ASPECTS

84 (W. Kaiser ed. 1978); W.

KAISER, TEXAS LIGNITE: NEAR SURFACE AND DEEP BASIN

RESOURCES 3 (1974) (Bureau of Economic Geology, University of Texas at Austin, Report of

Investigations No. 79).
131. W. KAISER, TEXAS

LIGNITE: NEAR SURFACE AND DEEP BASIS RESOURCES

3 (1974)

(Bureau of Economic Geology, University of Texas at Austin, Report of Investigations No.
79). See also Fisher, Texas Energy Reserves and Resources, 52 TEXAS BUS. REV. 145, 148

(1978).
132. U.S.

DEV. ADMINISTRATION, STATISTICAL DATA OF THE URA47 (1975) (Grand Junction, Colo.).
133. But see Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 751 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring).
134. Cf. Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 WYO. L.J. 107, 114
(1949) (admonishing against requiring title examiners to inquire into folklore of area in
ENERGY RESEARCH AND

NIUM INDUSTRY

question).

135. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1972); Getty Oil Co. v.
Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971).
136. See Sheffield v. Gibbs Bros. & Co., 596 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A recent Texas civil appeals court has found the
holding in Reed II is retroactive. See Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 601 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ).
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